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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTENSEN DIAMOND PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

8039

THERON S. COVEY, et al.,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent agrees generally with the Statement
of Facts which Appellants have set forth in their
brief. Inasmuch, however, as the Trial Court was
entitled to and did find adversely to the Appellants,
Respondent feels that emphasis should be properly
placed upon those facts favorable to the Respondent.
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Accordil1gly, certain of the testimony referred to
by the Appellants is not entitled to persuasive weight
on appeal.
The case appears to hinge largely upon the provisions of the "Joint Operating Agreement." Since
Respondent considers many of the provisions of this
Agreement which are omitted by the Appellants
from their brief to have great bearing upon this suit,
Respondent does not subscribe to the statement of
Appellants in their Statement of Facts that o~ly the
provisions of that Agreement set forth in their brief
are the material provisions upon the question of
whether or not a mining partnership existed. Respondent will point under the appropriate arguments
additional provisions which it deems material and
decisive.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

Christensen Diamond Products Company, the
Respondent herein, filed suit against the Appellants
and other defendants to recover the value of a diamond drill bit and other merchandise which was
purchased and used in the drilling operation on the
Bertie Slaugh No. 1 oil well, which is the well involved herein. The Trial ruled in favor of the Plaintiff and Respondent on the basis ~hat a mining partnership existed between the Appellants and Baird &
Robbins. The existence of that mining partnership
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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depends to a large extent upon the "Joint Operating
Agreement" heretofore referred to and into which
the parties entered.
Christensen Diamond Products Company sold
the merchandise to Baird & Robbins under circumstances set forth by Mr. William I. Harris, Sales and
Credit Manager of that company, as follows:
M. E. Baird came into Mr. Harris' office and
stated that they wanted some drilling equipment for
coring a well in the Uintah Basin. He came into the
office in response to the suggestion of Mr. Harris after
Mr. Baird had contacted the Christensen Diamond
Products Company salesman in the Vernal area.
At the time Mr. Baird came into the office, he told
Mr. Harris in response to inquiry that he had a silent
partner in Pocatello harned H. L. Robbins and that
there were others in Salt Lake City who had a financial interest in the lease and well being drilled
(Tr. 90-91). As the result of this conversation, credit
was extended. Thereafter, merchandise was delivered to the well site, and billings thereon were
directed to "Baird & Robbins" or to "Baird & Robbins
Drilling Company, 16-Y2 South Main Street, Salt
Lake qity, Utah" (Ex. J. K. L. M. 0. and P.). On one
occasion a core bit was picked up at the Christensen
Diamond Products Company by M. E. Baird and was
billed to "Baird & Robbins, Vernal, Utah," and was
signed by "M. E. Baird" (Ex. M). On another
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occasior1, I-I. L. Robbins signed a core barrel rental
agreement wjth the Christensen Diamond Products
Co1npany (Ex. 0), which agreement showed the well
ownPr or contractor to be "Baird & Robbins."
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.

The Evidence Sustains Finding No. 6, that Baird & Robbins
Drilling Co., Inc., had no Separate Existence in the Drilling of
the Oil Well Here Involved.

II. A Mining Partnership Existed by Virtue of the Joint Operating
Agreement.
A. Sharing of Losses
1 . An agreement for the sharing of losses is not a necessary requisite of a mining partnership.
2. There is no agreement in this case against Sharing of
Losses.
3. In the absence of an Express Agreement Against Sharing of Losses, an Implied Agreement to Share Such
Losses Arises.
4. There was an Express Agreement for the Sharing of
Losses.
B. All Elements of Joint Operation and Control Necessary to
Make out a Mining Partnership exist in this case.
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Point I.
The Evidence Sustains Finding No. 6, That Baird &
Robbins Drilling Co., Inc., Had No s·eparate or
Independent Activity, Function, or Existence in the Drilling
of the Oil Well Here Involved.

Point I of the Appellants' brief attacks Finding of
Fact No. 6, which is as follows:
"That by the terms of the aforesaid 'Joint
Operating Agreement' the said M. E. Baird
and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, were authorized alternatively to employ individuals for
the actual drilling and operation of the well or
to employ the services of a corporation to be
wholly owned by the said M. E. Baird and H.
L. Robbins; that on or about December 26,
1948, the said M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins
did, in fact, organize and form a Utah corporation wholly owned by the said M. E. Baird and
H. L. Robbins, having the corporate name of
'Baird & Robbins Drilling Co., Inc.,' that thereafter the said M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins
intermingled the funds and assets of the aforesaid partnership and of the aforesaid corporation and generally conducted the business
affairs of the said partnership and of the said
corporation, particularly with regard to the
drilling of the aforesaid well, without regard
to the individual capacity or separateness of
the said partnership and corporation, to the extent that the said Baird & Robbins Drilling Co.,
Inc., had no separate or independent activity,
function, or existence in the drilling of the
aforesaid well or the development of the aforesaid property."
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The argument made by the Appellants under
Point I, in which they cite several cases in which
the "corporate veil" may be pierced to reach personal
liability on the part of stockholders, has no application to the proposition which is involved herein. This
is 11ot a case in which the inquiry is whether or not
the corporation as an entity can be disregarded for
the purpose of holding individual stockholders liable
(which is the basis of the authorities cited by the
appellants) it rather involves the question of whether
or not the corporation actually did the drilling work
here involved as a separate and distinct entity or
whether or not the corporation, "Baird & Robbins
Drilling Co., Inc.," the partnership, "Baird & Robbins
Drilling Co.," and the individuals, Baird and Robbins,
are so closely intertwined, and the business affairs
which were conducted by them were so intermingled
that the Court could say, as it did, "Baird & Robbins
Drilling Co., Inc., did not as a separate entity drill
this oil well."
Actually, in view of Finding No. 5 of the Court
that "at all times hereinafter mentioned the defendants, M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, carried on business as co-partners under the firm name and style
of 'Baird & Robbins Drilling Company'; that in ·said
partnership capacity the said M. E. Baird and H. L.
Robbins, jointly with the Covey, conducted the operated the operation and drilling of the well on the
above-described property," Finding No. 6 is probably
immaterial. What we are really concerned with is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''rhether or not there is sufficient evidence to indicate
that Respondent dealt with the mining partne~ship
which the Court found to exist.
While the Appellants do not raise this as one
of the point upon \vhich they rely, they do, nonetheless, state under Point I that there is no evidence
to support the finding that the well was drilled by
the partnership, and accordingly we desire at this
point to set forth in some detail the evidence which
we contend establishes ( 1) that the "Baird & Robbins
Drilling Co., Inc." did not have a separate identity
in the drilling operation, and (2) that the Court
properly found that the mining partnership of M. E.
Baird and H. L. Robbins and the Coveys jointly conducted the operation and drilling of the well.
It should be noted parenthetically, however,
that, if the Appellants were correct in their statement
at the top of page 14 of their brief that "if the corporation did the drilling and purchased supplies from the
Respondent, there was no partnership with Appellants and no mining Partnership," then the Appellants would have been liable to the Respondent on
the Second Cause of Action, which the Respondent
(plaintiff below) asserted against these parties, that
is, that these Appellants and the other defendants
failed to require of their contractor, the Corporation,
a performance as required by Sees. 14-2-1 and 14-2-2
U.C.A. 1953.
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It becomes important at the outset to determine
what activities the partnership of Baird & Robbins
Drilling Company actually engaged in.
'!'hat such a partnership existed cannot be
doubted. M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins declared
themselves to be a partnership in the "Joint Operating Agreement" (Ex. C). On December 15, 1948,
M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins opened a partnership
account in the Continental Bank and Trust Company
of. Salt Lake City, Utah, in the name of "Baird &
Robbins Drilling Company," with only the partner,
M. E. Baird, entitled to sign checks thereon (Ex. F).
This, of course, was before the "Joint Operating
Agreement" came into existence. However, on January 20, 1949, some 15 days after the "Joint Operating Agreement" \Yas signed, the partners, M. E.
Baird and H. L. Robbins, signed a a new signature
card on the same acconut (Ex. G), in which they
reiterated that they were partners and ·that the name
of the partnership at that time was "Baird & Robbins
Drilling Company."
As heretofore indicated, Mr. M. E. Baird represented to Mr. Harris, Sales and Credit Manager for
Christensen Diamond Products Company, that he
was in a partnership with H. L. Robbins.
There is also abundant evidence of the intermingling of the partnership and corporatjon fund
and activities.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Substantially all of the funds which were used
in the drilling operation of the Bertie Slaugh No. 1
well passed through this account. A combination
journal, ledger, and check register was maintained
(Ex. No. 260), which shows the deposits which were
made in the Co11tinental Bank in the partnership
account and the withdrawals which were made
therefrom in connection with the drilling operation.
A comparison of this account with the ledger cards
of that bank (Ex. H) and the cancelled checks (Ex.
6, 7, and un-numbered exhibit dated July, 1949)
illustrates that substantially all of the monies expended in the drilling operation came from this
partnership account. That this account was never
changed from a partnership account is verified by
the testimony of Miss Mary Ballen, particularly at
pages 89, 94, and 98 of the Transcript. Miss Ballen
testified that she had searched the records of the
Continental Bank and Trust Company and found no
other account than the partnership account, "Baird
& Robbins Drilling Company," and specifically that
there was no account for Baird & Robbins Drilling
Co., Inc.
An examination of the checks which are exhibits
(Ex. 6, 7, and un-numbered exhibit dated July, 1949)
in the case, reveals that the checks were obviously
printed as partnership checks to correspond to the
partnership account in the Contine.ntal Bank and
Trust Company. However, someone at some time on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a great number of these checks was added in ink
following the designation, "Baird & Robbins Drilling
Co." which is printed at the bottom of the checks,
the word, "Imc." or, in some instances, "Inc." There
is no evidence whatsoever to establish when the inked
portion was added. In addition, several counter
checks are to be found in the above exhibits which
are signed, "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co."
A further fact which tends to establish the lack
of individual identity on the part of Baird & Robbins Drilling Co., Inc., is the fact that they assumed a
name which is so nearly identical with the partnership as to render it unlikely that anyone dealing
with one or the other of the entities would realize
that yet a second entity existed.
It is to be observed that no evidence was produced of a separate contract with the corporation or
otherwise to drill this well.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence
amply sustains the proposition that Baird & Robbins
Drilling Co., Inc., did not have an identity separate
and apart from the partnership in the drilling of the
oil 'veil and that the Court was justified in disregarding the corporation and finding that, in fact, the Respondent dealt with the partnership and that the part~
nership conducted the operation and drilling of the
well on the above-described prope!ty.
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POINT II.
A Mining Partnership Existed

i\ppellants divide their argument as to the nonexistence of the mining partnership into two subdivisions: ( 1) That there was no partnership because there was no sharing of losses, and (2) that
there was no partnership because there was no joint
cot1trol or operation. For convenience in answering
these arguments, Respondent will follow the same
general outline.
A.

SHARING OF LOSSES

An agreement for the sharing of losses is not a
necessary requisite of a mining partnership.

In a mining partnership, as distinguished from
a general partnership, there need be no sharing of
losses in order to establish the existence of a partnership relation. Sharing of losses flows from the existence of a mining partnership arrangement as one
of the incidents thereof, but it is not one of the requirements necessary to create that relationship.
The development of the concept of a mining
partnership, as separate and distinct from general
partnership, is a development which is unique in
the western states, where this concept originated.
It arose from the needs of the area, to meet specific
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and indigenous problems created by the development
of the western mining industry. It does not partake
of the refinements which are to be found in general
partnership law and is not tested by the same standards.
1,his is well stated by Summers Oil and
Gas, Permanent Edition, Volume 4, Section 721,
wherein that. author states:
"Through recognition by the courts of
customs and usages in mining communities it
has become a settled principle of law in many
of the jurisdictions in this country that when
co-owners of interests in mineral lands join
together in working such land for mineral purposes they thereby create a new relationship
known as a mining partnership. This relationship has been recognized by statutes in
some of the mining states."
And in Section 724 he continues:
"In the western states, where mm1ng
partnership was first recognized, joint ownership and joint operation of land for mineral
purposes was held sufficient to creal the relationship." (Italics added)
The requirements of joint ownership and joint
operation are the only basic requirements for a mining partnership, and they comprise what is sometimes described as the American Common Law of
Mining Partnerships. As indicated by Section 721,
this relationship has been codified in some of the
mining states ( 4 Summers Oil and Gas, Perm. Ed.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sec. 722). In other states, such as Utah, it has been
recognized by judicial precedent (Bentley vvs. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 Pac. 7 36).
At Section 724 of Summers' Oil and Gas, Perm.
Ed., Vol. 4, the author indicates that some states do
not subscribe completely to the doctrine of a partnership as developed in the West and have added
other requirements for its creation. However, most
of the states continue to require only the elements
heretofore set forth-that is, joint ownership and
joint operation-in order to create a mining partnership. To quote the remainder of that section:
"In other states where the relationship
has been recognized and applied to various
types of mining, except in Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and probably Texas, the requisites
for its creation and existence remain the
same.''
It is to be observed that the cases upon which
Appellants rely, to support the proposition that sharing of losses is an essential requirement .to establish
the ex;istence of a partnership, are Oklahoma cases,
with a single exception. That exception is an Iowa
case which is decided by a midwestern state on general partnership law. Consequently, it would be
proper to say that the Oklahoma citations represent
a minority view as to the requirements for the existence of a mining partnership and that the Iowa case
·of Farmers and Merchants National Bank vs. AnderSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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son, 216 I. 988, 250 N.W. 214, cannot be looked to
as an authority upon the proposition of a mining
partnership under western mining partnership law.

1,hat the law of mining partnership embraces
only the requirements of joint ownership and joint
operation is indicated in the case of Meister vs. Farrow, 109 Mont. 1, 92 Pac. 2nd 753 wherein the
court held that these elements were sufficient to
create a mining partnership and that these are the
only necessary elements.
A statement of the Montana statute which codifies the American Common Law of Mining Partnership, is also found in Wilkinson vs. Bell, ________ Mont.
--------, 168 P. 2d 201. Significantly, this and similar
codifications provide:
"An express agreement to become partners or to share the profits and losses of mining is not necessary to the formation and
existence of a mining partnership. The relation arises from the ownership of sh~res or
interests in the mine and working the same for
the purpose of extracting the minerals therefrom."
Summers' Oil and Gas, Perm. Ed., Vol. 4, Sec.
724, indicates that the ,courts which have added
additional requirements to the creation of a mining
partnership have confused the .incidents. which flow
from the existence .of such a legal relationship witl1
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the elements vvhich are necessary to the creatio11 of
such a relationship. This is exemplified by the
following quotation from Section 724 of that work:
·'In Munsey vs. Mills and Garrity the
Texas Court of Appeals recognized that a mining partnership arises by operation of law from
joint operation of a mine by co-owners, although it held in that case that a m~ning partnership was, in fact, created by the development contract. Again, in Wagner Supply Co.
vs. Bateman, the Supreme Court very clearly
held that a mining partnership may be created
by operation of law; yet the language of the
court in this opinion has since been interpreted
to mean that, for the creation of a mining partnership, there must be a sharing of profits,· a
community of interests, and a mutual agency
between partners, the usual elements of the
ordinary partnership, in addition to co-ownership and joint operation. The confusion in
these later cases seems to arise from the failure
of the courts to distinguish between the facts
necessary for the creation of a mining partnership and the legal relationship between the
partners once the relationship has been actually created.
Of equal interest in establishing that it is not
necessary that there be an agreement to share losses,
either express or implied, are the cases which hold
that persons dealing with the mining partnership are
not bound by limitations on the sharing of losses
between partners which are not communicated to
them. See Rae vs. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P.
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2d 1060, wherein the Court quoted from Kennedy vs.
Conrad, 91 Mont. 356, 92 P. 2d 1078 as follows:
"The general rule is that, as to thir4
persons who deal with a joint adventurer in
good faith and without knowledge of any limitation upon his authority, the law presumes
him to have been given power to bind his associates by such contracts as are reasonably necessary to carry on the business in which the
joint adventurers are engaged, and they become liable on such contracts notwithstanding
they may have expressly agreed amongst
themselves that they should not be liable."
In the Utah case, Bentley vs. Brossard 33 Utah
396, 94 Pac. 736, the court, speaking on the question
of existence of a mining partnership, stated:
"Again, referring to the contract of defendants, it seems quite clear that they associated themselves together to work and develop
the group of mines in question for their common benefit; that each had an interest in and
to the lease, and in working and developing
the properties, and in carrying on the mining
operations; and that each had a community
interest in whatever profits that were to be derived from such operation. The agreement,
under all the authorities, contains every requisite of a mining partnership."
2.

There is no agreement against sharing of losses.

Appellants have cited the following provisions of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the '·Joint Operati11g Agreement" as evidence of an
agreement against sharing of losses:
~'No

part of any costs or expenses for the drilling
of said well * * * shall be charged or be a claim upon
the second parties."
·'The corporation shall have no claim against
the second part~es, nor any lien against said leasehold."
"Operator shall at all times keep the joint interest of the parties herein in and to the leases and
the product therefrom and equipment free and clear
of all labor and mechanics' liens and encumbrances."
These provisions, however, do not constitute an
agreement against sharing of losses. They constitute
nothing more than an agreement to share in the expenses of development and drilling only to the extent
of $16,000.00 plus pipe of a value of $7,500.00. If
these expenses were the only losses which could arise
in this drilling operation, then no doubt these provisions alone constitute an express agreement to share
in the losses in the absence of an agreement that the
appellants were to be reimbursed for these expenditures in the event the well should fail to produce.
What Appellants seek to do is to substitute a
limitation as to certain expenses in place of "losses"
in its broader sense.
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In seeking to limit losses to this restricted meaning, it appears that appellants would come within
the purview of Hill vs. Curtis 154 App. Div. 662,
139 N.Y.S. 428, where the question involved was
whether two attorneys were partners, they having
undertaken certain contingent claims together. The
Court in reviewing this situation said:
'The agreement clearly provided for par~
ticipation in the profits. In effect, it provided
also for participation in the losses. By its
terms each of the parties agreed to pay onehalf of the expenses that may be incurred in
the prosecution of said claims. As the claims
were taken upon a contingent basis, the only
losses that could result to the parties thereto
from the prosecution of the enterprise would
arise from the time and labor expended and
the disbursement of money made by them in
connection therewith. The agreement demanded both."
·
4

Thus, if the terms, "costs" or "expenses," or the
term "charges" can be used as a substitute for the
word "losses" and if, in effect, it is Appellants' argument that a contract that one party shall not be
charged or liable for charges, costs, or expenses is, in
effect, an agreement not to share losses-then their
argument must fail, for the Coveys expressly undertook in this Paragraph (Paragraph IV. A.) that they
might be charged with the expenses and costs of
drilling and development of the well to the extent
of $16,000.00.
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3. In the Absence of an Express Agreement against
sharing Losses, an Implied Agreement to Share Losses
Arises.

This principle is one well established in general
partnership law, and the case of Bentler vs. Brossard
33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, while not having this question directly involved, recognized the rule.
At Point 2 above we have heretofore pointed
out that, if the term "losses" can be interpreted to
embrace only the items which the "Joint Operating
Agreement" denominates "Expenses of Development
and/or Drilling," nontheless this would constitute
an express agreement to share losses. However, we
feel that the term "losses" has a m.eaning which is
much more expanded than the limited and narrow
meaning which Appellants seemingly seek to ascribe
to it.
It is doubtful whether an agreement between
partners to the effect that none of the costs or expenses of a certain phase of the contemplated business
"shall be charged or be a claim upon" one of the
partners is an agreement not to share in the losses.
It should seem that a di~tinction must properly be
made between the terms "expenses" and the term
"losses" and that a partner who merely says that, as
between the parties, certain expenses are not to be
charged to him is not sufficiently guarding himself
against the possibility of sharing in the ultimate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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losses, whether by reason of the unsatisfied claims of
creditors or whetl1er by merely the expenditure of
all contributed capital, regardless of any remaining
indebtedness.
For the reason, therefore, that ''losses" embrace
a field much greater than the limitations imposed
as to sharing certain expenses, as set forth in the
"Joint Operating Agreement," Respondent asserts
tl1at, these provisions of the "Joint Operating Agreement" do not constitute an agreement against sharing of losses and that, therefore, on the theory advanced by the Appellants, either there was an agreement to share losses, as heretofore indicated at Point
B, or else nothing is said about sharing of losses, and
therefore, by implication, the sharing of losses follows from the partnership relationship.
4. There Was an Express Agreement for the
Sharing of Losses

In addition to the argument advanced under
Point 2, which is limited to the question of sharing
certain expenses as sharing of losses, the "Joint Oper.:.
ating Agreement" expressly provides for the sharing
of losses.
1. The "Joint Operating Agreement" contains
provisions which we believe by proper interpretation
thereof constitutes an express agreement to share in
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the losses of this er1terprise. This is illustrated in the
following way:
Paragraph I. A. of the agreement provides that
Appellants agree to pay $16,000.00 and receive a
12-percent interest in the leases, and Paragraph B
thereof provides for purchase of pipe by Appellants
of a value of $7,500.00.
Paragraph IV. A. provides that this money is to
be used only for payment of drilling and development
charges on Well No. 1.
Paragraph VI provides that "all drilling and development charges except for the first well ... shall
be charged to the joint account of the parties hereto"
under the accounting procedure set forth in Exhibit
B of the "Joint Operating Agreement."
Thus, all of the charges of every nature except
drilling and development charges for the first well
are to be charged to the joint account of the parties
in proportion to the interests of the parties under the
lease. These items, by reference to Exhibit B of the
"Joint Operating Agreement," consist of such items
as: delay of rentals, royalties, labor and teaming
charges, cost of moving materials, cost of moving
surplus materials, damages or losses incurred by fire,
flood, storm, or any other cause; expenses of litigation, judgments, liquidated claims, fees of attorneys,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
taxes, insurance, camp expenses, and overhead
charges on the basis of $1,000.00 per month .
..-fhe only limitation, then upon charges against
the joint accouut are those specified in Paragraph IV.
A., heretofore referred to, that is, the expenses of
drilling and development of the first well. This does
not constitute an agreement that all of the other
overhead charges and losses which might arise in
the drilling of the first well shall not be charged
against the joint account, but to the contrary, a reading of the above provisions clearly illustrates that all
other expenses and losses are to be charged to the
joint acconut. Accordingly, the appellants expressly
agreed to share in all losses of the operation and all
overhead expense and charges thereof, thus establishing the element of sharing of losses if such sharing
of losses is determined by the court to be a necessary
element in the creation of a mining partnership,
vvhich we, of course, contend that it is not.
2. This agreement contemplated the drilling of
more than one well. The "Joint Operating Agreement" expressly makes provision for the respective
rights and obligations of the parties in the diilling of
additional wells. Quite clearly by the terms of Para- .
graph VI even drilling and development charges
were to be charged to the joint account of the parties
in the same ratio in which they shared profits as to
all wells except the first well.
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The "Joint Operating Agreement" did not set up
one partnership for the first well and a separate partnership for the remaining wells. The parties agreed
in one document as to the contribution of capital,
their ratio of profits, and their respective rights of
control, etc., and contemplated that these relationships would continue throughout the anticipated
business of drilling several wells. It will not now
lie in the mouths of the parties to say that, by limiting
their loss obligation in a part of the venture to
$16,000.00 and certain pipe, by undertaking their
loss obligation as to the balance of the venture in the
same ratio as they shared profits, they did not as to
the total venture contemplated by the agreement
become partners.
3. Further evidence that the parties contemplated a sharing by the Coveys in the costs and ex.:.
penses of the venture even as to the first well is the
interesting language of Paragraph VIII.B.: ·
"Non-operators shall have a lien on the
interests of the operators in said leases and
agreements and oil and gas produced therefrom, and proceeds thereof, and the material
and equipment thereof, to secure the payment
of operators' proportionate share of the costs
and expenses of developing and operating the
said lands, for the purpose of keeping said property clear and free of liens and encumbrances
upon the property of non-operators."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
B. All elements of Joint Operation and Control necessary
to make out a Mining Partnership exist in this case.

The following items of joint operation and control reserved to appellants are to be gleaned from a
per·usal of the "Joint Operating Agreement": (Ex. C.)
1. Paragraph IV.A. provides that appellants
contribution of $16,000.00 is to be used only for
payment of drilling and development charges in connection 'vith the drilling of this well.
2. Paragraph IV.B. provides that the operation
shall be conducted in a good and workmanlike manner and in accordance with good oil field practice.
It also provides further controls with respect to drilling under terms and conditions customary and usual
i11 the field in contracts of independent contractors;
limits the deviation of the well to three degrees; and
specifies when the well shall be deemed complete.
3. That the abandonment of any well which
had produced oil or gas in commercial quantities
for a period of 30 days should be permitted only by
Baird & Robbins upon first securing the written approval of the Coveys (VII.A ( 1) ) .
4. That no capital expenditure in excess of
$5,000.00 should be binding upon the Coveys excepting with their prior written approval.
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5. That the vvritten consent of the Coveys would
be required for all necessary expenditures in the
drilling, completing, and equipping of the well, including the necessary least? tankage (VII.A (2)).

6. That the written approval of the, Coveys
vYould be required for the sale and disposition of
surplus materials and equipment by Baird & Robbins
(VII.A (3)).
7. "That all equipment, facilities, and structures purchased on account of the joint operation of
the parties" shall be deemed to be owned 12 percent
by the Coveys (VII.A(3) ).
8. The Coveys reserved the right of access to the
lands at all reasonable times to inspect and observe
operations of every kind and character upon the
property (VII.B ( 1)).
9. The Coveys reserved the right of access at all
reasonable times to any and all information pertaining to wells, drilling, production secured, and oil
marketed, and to the books, records, and vouchers
relating to the operation of the lands subject to the
agreement. (VII.B (2)).
10. The Coveys reserved the right upon request
to receive from Baird & Robbins daily drilling reports,
true and complete copies of well logs, tank tables,
daily gauge and run tickets, and reports of stock on
hand (VII.B ( 3) ) .
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11. The Coveys further reserved the right upon
request to receive from Baird and Robbins samples
and cuttings from "any and all wells drilled" on
lands in which the Coveys had an interest (VII.B (3)}.
12. By the terms of the said agreement, the said
Baird & Robbins agreed with the said Coveys and
undertook to comply with all lawful regulation and
prepare and furnish reports to any duly constituted
authority as requested or required by the Coveys.
(\'III.B).
13. The Coveys further reserved to themselves,
subject to the provisions of the aforesaid "Joint Operating Agreement," "an undivided 12-percent working
interest in all oil, gas, natural gasoline, and other
hydrocarbon substances produced, saved, and removed from the lands." (IX.A)
1+. In connection with Coveys' agreement to
purchase for a price of $7,500.00 approximately 3,500
fee of 4% inch drill pipe in 32-foot lengths (1. C; XI),
Coveys reserved the right that, upon loading and
shipping the same, cargo insurance in favor of Coveys
would be procured by Baird & Robbins, title would be
taken in the name of Coveys, and the bill of lading
would be held in the name of the Coveys.
15. Coveys further reserved the right in connection with the said pipe to have the same maintained
upon the land described in the agreen;tent and in a
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pile identified as the pipe of the Coveys and to receive
accounts from Baird & Robbins for said pipe at all
times and to have the same returned following use
in as good condition as new, save and excepting
usual wear. (XI. )
16. Appellants specified by the medium of the
joint operating agreement itself (IV-A) that the
partnership should commence drilling the well on or
before the 1st day of February 1949; and also that
of the $16,000, the balance of $8,000 should only be
paid by appellants to the partnership "upon the commencement of the drilling of the first well." (I. A.)
Thus it is amply clear that all of the elements of
joint operation and control necessary under any
theory of partnership are present in this case.
Actually, however, control as such does not
play so important a part in the determination of
mining partnership existence as Appellants seem
to indicate. All that is necessary is that there be a
joint operation, together with joint ownership. This
rule is clearly announced in Meister vs. Farrow, ( 109
Mont. 1, 92 P. 2d 7 53), wherein it is said:
"The rule in Montana, as in other jurisdictions, is that the requirement that the partners engage jointly in working the property
may be met where the other features of the
relationship exist, even though all of the partners do not take part in actually performing
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work on the mine or take part in the supervisory work."
As establishing that joint operation need not
en1brace more than contributing money, see Meister
vs. Farrow (supra) and the case of Harper vs. Sloane,
177 Cal. 174, 169 P. 1043, 181 P. 775, wherein
the only evidence of joint operation was the contribution of money and wherein the court held:
"We do not understand that it is essential
to a mining partnership that each of the partners shall actually perform physical labor
upon the claim. Where one of them supplies
money which is to be used in working the
claim, he is engaged in such work as truly as is
the one who devotes his own labor to the
enterprise.''
To like effect, see Lyman vs. Schwartz 13 Col. App.
218, 57 P. 735.
It is submitted that all of the elements of joi~t
operation and control necessary to creating mining
partnership exists under the facts of this case and
are to be found in the "Joint Operation Agreement"
the stipulation of counsel that the $16,000.00 was
paid and the pipe furnished, and the admissions as
to ownership of an interest in the lease.

*

*

*
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In summary-.L\ppellants were not content to
merely hire a11 i11dependent firm of drilli11g contractors. Had they done so without obtaining the statutory performance bond, they would have become
personally liable to unpaid laborers and material
men. Nor 'vere the Appellants satisfied to merely
btly shares by way of investment in an oil development. They alone, of all the investors, insisted upon
a very extensive, complicated, and in many respects
ambiguous if not inconsistent Joint Operating Agreement which guaranteed them the protection of certain accounting procedures and many significant
rights of control and direction if not in fact of actual
"joint operation" of the well with the Baird & Robbins
partnership. Now they would like to escape the liabilities which the law imposes upon such mining
partners by asserting that. the reserved rights of direction and control which they thus bargained for were
really unimportant and insignificant, and that because they relieved themselves from certain specified
charges or expenses excepting as the same might be
charged against their $16,0,00 contribution, they were
mere investors and not mining partners. This is
certainly an anamalous attempt to create a new relationship somewhere short of partnership liability
but certainly far beyond a mere investor. To
permit an evasion of liability by an owner of land
who does not secure a performance bond, reserves the
direction of the improvement work being done, shares
in the profits, and contributes capital which is at
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risk in the event of a loss, and undertakes certain additional but limited obligations to share in expenses,
charges and losses from certain portions of the contemplated venture, is to negative all of the protections which the Legislatures have carefully built
up to surrour1d this relationship and which the
cu1nmon law of mining partnership has amplified.
A reversal of the trial court's decision invites a sharp
trader to work out a sui juris relationship completely
beyo11d the case law or statutory law and to permit
a participating partner to reap the profits without
any risk of the losses of his venture.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted by the Respondent
that Finding No. 6 that Baird & Robbins Drilling Co.,
Inc., had no separate or independent activity, function, or existence in the drilling of the oil well here
involved is sustained by the evidence; that, however,
this finding is not essential to the determination of
this case and that Finding No. 5, which is clearly
sustained by the evidence, supplies all of the essentials necessary on this phase of the case; that sharing
of losses is only an incident which flows from the
relationship of mining partnership and is not one
of the essentials to the creation of a :rnining partnership; that, nonetheless, if sharing of losses is an essential to the creation of the mining partnership relationship, such sharing of losses exists in this case;
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that there is ample evidence of joint operation and
joint ownership herein to sustain the Trial Court in
his ruling that a mining partnership did, in fact, exist.
Respectfully submitted,
OWEN & WARD and
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD

Attorneys for Respondent
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